South Sudan: A War-Torn and Divided Region by Kebbede, Girma
Contributions in Black Studies
A Journal of African and Afro-American Studies
Volume 15 Sudan's Predicament: Civil War,
Displacement, & Ecological Degradation Article 4
1997
South Sudan: A War-Torn and Divided Region
Girma Kebbede
Mount Holyoke College
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Afro-American Studies at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Contributions in Black Studies by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kebbede, Girma (1997) "South Sudan: A War-Torn and Divided Region," Contributions in Black Studies: Vol. 15 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol15/iss1/4
Girma Kebbede
SOUTH SUDAN: A WAR-TORN
AND DIVIDED REGION
S OUTH SUDAN comprises ten states in three provinces: Upper Nile (UpperNile, Jonglei, and Unity States), Bahr el Ghazal (West Bahr el-Ghazal,North Bahr el-Ghazal, EI-Buheirat, and Warab states), and Equatoria
(Bahr el-Jebel, East Equatoria and Western Equatorial states). The region as a
whole covers an area of 638,148 square kilometers, just over one quarter of
Sudan's total area. It is an area as big as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands
combined. It occupies approximately one-third ofSudan's Nile Basin. In 1993,
the population ofthe region was estimated at 7 million, which was slightly over
one-quarter of the country's total population. Several diverse ethnic groups
inhabit the region, the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk being the largest. With a
population size ofabout 3.6 million (approximately 12 percent of the popula-
tion ofSudan), the Dinka are the majority in the region. They are spread over
a wide area ofsouthern Sudan. The majority ofthem live in Bahr el Ghazal and
Upper Nile Provinces. A significant number also live in the southern part of
Southern Kordofan Province. The Nuer, a population ofnearly 1.5 million (5
percent of the country's population) live between the Sobat and White Nile
rivers in Upper Nile Province. They occupy extensive grasslands. The Shilluk
live in the Malakal area along the west bank of the White Nile in Upper Nile
Province.
Before the civil war that has affected the area since 1983, it was
estimated that two-thirds of the population derived their living from pastoral-
ism, supplemented by limited cropping of maize and sorghum. The principal
areas ofpastoralism are the western provinces of the Upper Nile state, Eastern
Equatoria, Jonglei, and parts of Bahr el Ghazal. The remaining third of the
population were crop cultivators who supplemented their main livelihood by
harvesting wild food resources such as plants, fish, and game animals. Condi-
tions for crop cultivation are nearly always favorable to grow at least two rounds
of crops annually since precipitation in the region is generally high. There is
ample arable land. In Upper Nile Province, which is the southerly extension of
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the great central clay plain ofSudan ofwhich the Gezira is part, two-thirds of
the land is potentially arable, and rainfall is adequate for crop cultivation without
irrigation (Ministry ofInformation and Culture, 1971: 18). Livestock are the
mainstay of the province. Even though the Sudd swamp absorbs most ofBahr
el Ghazal, it possesses nearly a million feddans of land suitable for crop
cultivation. Equatoria, which has the richest forest resources in the country, also
has great agricultural potential; in the past, all major tropical crops have been
grown in this part ofthe southern region, along the border with Uganda, Zaire
and the Central Mrican Republic.
A substantial part of the South-l00,OOO square kilometers- is
essentially inundated by the rising flood waters of the Nile, creating the vast
swamplands of Bahr el Jebel and Bahr el Ghazal, known as the Sudd. During
the dry season rich grassy plains cover over two-thirds ofthe Sudd to which the
seminomadic Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk inhabitants of the region bring their
herds of cattle to graze. These three groups make up the majority of the
transhumant pastoralists in the region, and possess more than four-fifths of
southern Sudan's cattle population (Full, 1988: 65). In the Sudd there are
immense amounts offish. People fish during the dry season when flood waters
recede and rivers dry up in isolated shallow ponds (Noordwijk, 1984: 136).
During the periods ofhigh water people retreat to the higher ground where they
have semi-permanent homesteads and grow millet and maize and graze their
livestock on rainfed pasture (Smith, 1992: 132). In the humid highland regions
bordering Zaire and Uganda, people practice shifting cultivation with slash and
burn techniques. Many areas of these remote and almost inaccessible high
altitude regions of Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria are off limits to pastoralism,
owing to infestation by the tsetse fly, particularly during the long rainy season.
The lack of development in southern Sudan has a long history. The
region has never received its fair apportionment ofdevelopment resources and
political power, whether before or after independence. Under British rule,
much of the political, economic, and infrastructural development occurred in
the North, particularly in the fertile central savanna plains adjoining the Blue
Nile River. What little economic and social services were established in the
South under the British were concentrated primarily in Equatoria since they had
control of this province long before they reached the migratory pastoral
population further north. At any rate, after 58 years of British rule, the South
entered independence having "only five university graduates, one secondary
school, a handful of secondary school graduates, five junior administrative
officers-and no doctors, engineers, agronomists, or other experts; and no
industries, trade, or any economic projects" (Garang, 1985: 23). Ever since
independence in 1956, successive national governments have deliberately
ignored the economic, social, and cultural development of the South. Even
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though relative peace and tranquillity prevailed in the region in the 1970s, the
central government made very little effort to improved the living standards of
the people. Most ofthe population ofthe region lack access to such basic social
services as education and health facilities, clean water, and electricity. Interna-
tional organizations ofvarious kinds, United Nations agencies including World
Food and Agricultural Organizations, the United Nations Children's Fund,
and the World Health Organization, provide the few services that exist.
The region's rate of infant mortality is one of the highest in Mrica.
Estimates for various parts ofthe region range between 100 and 250 per 1,000
live births (House, 1989: 202). Those who survive their first birthday usually
decline in health once they are weaned. Life expectancy at birth in 1991 was less
than 49 years. The incidence of malaria, which has significantly been reduced
in most Mrican countries, remains the major killer in southern Sudan. Other
preventable diseases such as measles, infantile gastro-enteritis, tuberculosis, and
diarrhoeic disorders are major causes of death as well. The lack of safe, clean
water is the major cause of ill-health as the main sources ofwater for the great
majority of the population are streams, rivers and wells that harbor numerous
tropical diseases. In 1990, primary-school age enrollment was 49 percent ofthe
whole Sudan (World Bank, 1993: 293), but only 16 percent in Upper Nile and
6 percent in Bahr el Ghazal (House, 1989: 128). Only one in five southern
Sudan's estimated one million school-age children are able to attend school.
Only 5 percent of these students are girls. The three regional capitals ofJuba,
Malakal, and Wau-which house only three percent of the region's popula-
tion-lack most basic urban amenities. These so-called urban centers are no
more than agglomerated villages without any industrial establishment worthy
of a name. Since the resumption of the second civil war, these cities have
deteriorated to the point where they have essentially become almost uninhab-
itable. In the past, the inhabitants ofthese regional centers depended heavily for
employment in the public sector and small-scale informal enterprises. With little
development taking place in the region, however, jobs were extremely scarce.
Many southerners migrated to northern cities or traveled long distances to
large-scale agricultural schemes to work as manual laborers during the harvest
season.
Transportation infrastructure is poorly developed. The region is served
by no roads or rails for the most part. Rivers are the main channels of
communication. Khartoum is more than a week away by steamer from Juba.
Wau, Bahr el Ghazal's capital, is the only city that is linked with the North by
a railway line. Large areas ofthe region are inaccessible during the four months
ofrainy season when roads and rails are flooded for the most part. Much ofthe
South is cut off from the capital during this period.
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The Birth of The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A)
In July 1983, a number of mutinous army units in southern Sudan
convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and founded the Sudan People's Libera-
tion Movement and its armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLM/A). The founders elected Colonel John Garang commander of both
the SPLM and SPLA. With the birth ofSPLM/A, the South seemed to unite
for a common cause. The members ofSPLM/A's 13-person High Command
represented all the major ethnic groups in the region, even though the bulk of
the SPLM/A rank and file initially came from the Dinka and Nuer, the two
largest ethnic groups in the South. The movement brought in many of the
younger generation of educated southern Sudanese. In the past, before the
emergence of the SPLM/A, the internal southern leadership was fragmented.
There was a proliferation ofpolitical parties and movements such as Southern
Sudan Liberation Front, South Mrican National Union, Sudan Mrican Libera-
tion Front, Southern Front Party, and Sudan Republican Party; all failed to end
southern miseries because oflack ofpolitical unity and perspicacious leadership.
SPLM/A's professed goal to end religious and racial discrimination as well as
political and economic injustice was positively received by many in the South.
The founding of the SPLM/A looked to have finally unified the region.
From the outset SPLM/A pronounced that its ultimate goal was not
to separate the South from the North but to establish a "secular, non racial,
federal Sudan." It opposed any attempt to divide Sudan on the basis ofreligion,
ethnicity or any sort of cultural differentiation. On this matter, its manifesto
unambiguously declared: "The South is an integral and inseparable part of the
Sudan. Mrica has been fragmented sufficiently by colonialism, and its further
fragmentation can only be in the interest of her enemies." (SPLM/A, 1983:
43). This stance won the SPLM/A political support from many northern
Sudanese democrats at home and broad, including the National Democratic
Alliance (an amalgam of northern Sudanese opposition groups). Many north-
ern opposition groups also supported SPLM/A's unity position. It is ironic that
while over the last 13 or so years the SPLM/A has been pushing for a united
Sudan free of any discrimination among its diverse national groups, successive
ruling regimes in Khartoum have been pursuing policies that discriminate and
divide Sudan.
The SPLM/A achieved several battle successes against the government
Army during its early years. During the dry season of 1987, it captured Jokau,
Pibor, and Tonga. By 1988, it took Pochalla, and Boma along the Ethiopian
border, Kapoeta near the Ugandan border, and Shambe, Ler, and Yirrol in the
center of the region. It even expanded its armed activities outside the South,
penetrating into Blue Nile and Kordofan Provinces. By the end of 1988, it
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expanded further to the west and controlled vast areas and a number ofgarrison
towns in Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal Provinces. By the beginning of 1989,
it controlled nearly all ofsouthern Sudan and forced the Mahdi defense minister
to publicly admit that the war was unwinnable by military might and that
political solutions be sought instead. SPLM/A's battle victories added fuel to
the political turmoil in Mahdi's coalition government and provided a conducive
environment for a group of Islamic military officers, backed by the NIF, to
overthrow the Prime Minister.
Ethiopia's contribution to the SPLM/A military success in the 1980s
was considerable. The Mengistu regime not only gave sanctuary to the SPLM/
A's leadership but also supplied advanced weapons, equipment and medicine
and logistical support to the movement. Thanks to the support of the Addis
Ababa government, it managed to publicize its position to the world and win
the propaganda war against the Khartoum regime to achieve international
legitimacy. Its commander-in-chief, John Garang, looked a credible leader to
most Mrican nations-as someone who could save Sudan from degenerating
into political disintegration.
However, too much dependence on Ethiopia and especially close
association with its ruthless leader, Colonel Mengistu, later became a tremen-
dous liability from which the SPLM/A has yet to recover. Following the
overthrow ofColonel Mengistu in May 1991, the new Ethiopian rulers ejected
the SPLM/A from its strategically vital military training bases in western
Ethiopia. Overnight the SPLM/A lost all material and logistical support it had
been getting from Ethiopia. This huge setback caused traditional rivalries and
power struggles to surface within the movement. Some members of the High
Command started to accuse the movement ofhuman rights abuses, dictatorial
leadership, and favoritism towards the Dinka ethic group.
In August 1991, Commander Riak Machar, a Nuer, and two of his
colleagues (Lam Akol and Gordon Kong) staged a coup to seize control ofthe
movement from its founding leader, John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka. The
coup attempt failed but led to the division ofthe movement along ethnic lines.
Worst of all, and much to the delight of the Bashir-Turabi regime, it set off
bloody battles between the Dinka and the Nuer, the two largest ethnic groups
in the region. Thousands ofpeople were killed and several hundred thousand
civilians perished in the ensuing famine.
The SPLM/A thus split into two groups: the main Dinka-dominated
force (now called SPLM/A-Mainstream) led by Garang and the splinter group
(called SPLM/A-United, but later renamed the Southern Sudan Independence
Movement/Army-SSIM/A) headed by Machar. The former controlled most
ofEquatoria while the latter controlled most ofUpper Nile province. The two
groups continued to engage in several ferocious battles in 1991 and 1992 and
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intermittent clashes in 1993 and 1994 as well. The fighting between the factions
inflicted as much destruction on local people and livelihood as did government
offenses. Khartoum did everything in its power to exploit this fratricidal
infighting by bribing and supplying weapons to dissident Nuer guerrilla forces.
This divide-and-conquer policy is one of the key elements helping the regime
to sustain the war and to regain most ofthe territory it had lost in the late 1980s.
However, it has been unable to bring Garang and his armed forces to their
knees, in spite of its equipment, troop and air superiority.
The division in the southern movement took a dramatic turn when in
June 1996 the leaders of a splinter group (Riak Machar, Kerubino Kwanyim
Bol, and Lam Akol) declared their defection and signed a "Political Charter"
with the government calling for the resolution ofthe conflict through peaceful
and political means. Bol was one ofthe founding members ofSPLM/Ain 1983
and second in command to Col. John Garang. He later joined the splinter group
SPLM/A-United formed in 1991. Riek Machar, signing for the Southern
Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) said: "I have come to contribute to
the breaking of the barriers of mistrust, hatred, and lack of confidence which
have characterized relations between north and south Sudan for the last 40
years." (Reuters, 10 April 1996. ). It is ironical that Machar, who had vowed to
separate the South from the North and accused Garang of holding a united
Sudan view, would cooperate with a regime that is extremist by any standard.
Interestingly enough, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi received these three former SPLM/
A members and later witnessed the signing. By all account, Dr. Turabi is
responsible for the escalation of the war and for unleashing the forces of
intolerance against the southerners.
The signing of the "Political Charter" has not broken the war stale-
mate. Instead, it has deepened ethnic divisions and animosity between and
among the Dinka and Nuertribal groups. Armed and financed by the Khartoum
regime, the Machar and Kerubino forces continue to fight against the SPLM/
A-mainstream forces. Kerubino now heads a government militia which has
brought untold destruction to southern Sudan in the last two years. The Mrican
Human Rights Watch has reported that "in alliance with Sudan government,
his troops routinely attacked, looted, and burned civilian villages, killing
civilians, wiping out their cattle and grain, and sparking a need for emergency
relief." (Human Rights Watch: Africa, 1996: 57). This group routinely impedes
the delivery of relieffood to SPLM/A-controlled areas.
Mter six years offighting with Machar's breakaway faction and renewed
government offensives, Garang's SPLM/A-Mainstream is now on the re-
bound. It has been rearmed by Sudan's neighbors, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia
and Eritrea, who fear Sudan's support for armed Islamic groups and other anti-
government elements in the region. Many officers from break-away factions
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have rejoined the Mainstream forces in Nasir region ofUpper Nile Province. In
October 1995, the SPLM/A launched its largest antigovernment attack in years
and captured Parajok. In May 1996 SPLM/A forces gained victory over the
government army and captured once again the towns ofPachalla in the Upper
Nile Province and Khor Yabus in the southern part of the Blue Nile Province.
In the first halfof 1997, SPLM/A forces dislodged government soldiers from
several major towns in southern and southeastern Sudan. By mid-1997, the
SPLM/A controlled about two-thirds of the South and a swath of territory in
the east near the Eritrean border. The victory of Laurent Kabila in Zaire (now
renamed the Democratic Republic ofCongo) has redrawn the military equation
in favor ofSPLM/A. The Islamic government in Sudan was close to Mobutu
Sese Seko, the ousted ex-Zaire's dictator, and often used the northern part of
Zaire to keep the SPLM/A in check. The SPLM/A is Laurent Kabila's
supporter and Mobutu's downfall has helped it to regain control over large areas
in the South.
Consequences of the War
The impact ofthe war has been devastating for both the people and the
environment in the war-torn region of the South and has further affected the
lives ofall Sudanese in one way or another. The human cost of the war is quite
substantial. No one knows for certain the precise number ofpeople who have
perished since the war began again in 1983. Estimates suggest that the war has
already claimed over 1.5 million lives, starved to death several hundred
thousand people, and displaced over three million (as many as one-halfofthese
fled north to refugee makeshift shelters around Khartoum and Omdurman,
trekking a perilous 1,000 miles). By the end of the 1980s, more than one-half
million people sought refuge in neighboring countries (Woodward, 1990: 218-
219). A generation of children and young people have lost their lives. Of the
250,000 or so people who perished owing to war and famine in 1988 alone,
one-halfwere children (Minear, 1991: 6). Those 'fortunate' enough to survive
are lett with permanent disabilities that cannot be repaired at later ages even if
their diets improve.
Fleeing the war zone does not necessarily guarantee safety. When
twelve hours oftorrential rain fell on Khartoum on 4 August 1988, over three-
quarters of the city was under water, rendering an estimated million and a half
people homeless. More than a million southern refugees living in makeshift
shelters around the city were the hardest hit by the floodwaters. Hundreds died
ofdiseases in the days and months following the disaster. As ifthis tragedy were
not enough, toward the end ofl990 the government destroyed these makeshift
camps and forced refugees to relocate 30 miles from Khartoum, in the midst of
a barren desert area with no water, food or electricity (The New York Times, 4
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November 1990). According to Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), A French
non-governmental organization, between 1991 and 1993 an estimated 350,000
refugees were forcibly-in some cases violently-relocate to inhospitable sites
too far from Khartoum to seek employment opportunities (Hammond, 1994:
3). Even those southerners, especially children, who live among relatives or
work in Khartoum have not escaped this forceful eviction. A Human Rights
Watch (September 1995: 2) reported:
Since 1992 the government has engaged in a campaign of 'cleaning up'
city streets by rounding up alleged street children, mostly from the
displaced population, and sending them to special, state-run closed
camps. . . . What is worse, the state authorities running the cleanup
campaign and the camps often do not pay attention to the children's
protestations that they have families. One young man told Human Rights
Watch that although he told the police and camp authorities that he had
a job and a family, they ignored him. Another small child, about six years
old when he was captured on his way to market, was too intimidated to
tell the authorities that he had a family, nor did they ever ask, in the more
than two years he has been kept in the camp. Children have been
separated for years, and remained separated, from their families, whose
frantic search for their missing children is not assisted at all by the
government.
The flow of refugees from the civil war into neighboring countries
continues, often at the rates of tens of thousands every year. Thus far, over
500,000 southerners have been forced to flee and seek refuge in neighboring
Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and the Central African Republic. Uganda is the main
recipient ofSudanese refugees. According to the UHNCR there are 209,796
refugees in Uganda, 110,000 in Zaire, 63,000 in Ethiopia, and 41 ,000 in Kenya
(Miheisi, 1996: 6). These people remain trapped in disease-prone refugee
camps, uprooted from their culture, their traditional way of life, and with no
means to support themselves.
Whereas those who have fled to the neighboring countries receive relief
help and some degree of security from the international humanitarian organi-
zations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
those internally displaced southern civilian populations continue to endure
untold suffering at the hands of their own government. Since the main
instrument ofinternational refugee laws, the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status ofRefugees, specifically defines refugees as "being outside their country
ofnationality," the UNHCR's mandate is to assist and protect those refugees
who have crossed international borders. Even thought the UNHCR has in
recent years been involved in a number of humanitarian operations on behalf
of internally displaced people (for instance, in ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
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Ethiopia, and Iraq), its effort in Sudan has failed because of the unwillingness
of the Sudanese government to allow the international community to provide
help and protection to war-displaced citizens within its national boundaries.
Having lost their homes, their jobs, and their livelihoods, the three million or
so internally displaced peoples of southern Sudan continue to endure more
suffering. Those who fled to the Khartoum metropolitan area find themselves
thrown in make-shift camps with very little support coming trom the national
government or humanitarian organizations and are constantly harassed by the
Sudanese security forces. Hundreds of thousands of civilian populations
constantly move from one place to another inside the southern region, seeking
safety and food. More often than not tor these people, such moves lead only to
more suffering, insecurity, and death. Because these people find themselves
within the conflict area, humanitarian interventions on their behalfare severely
curtailed. Few humanitarian organizations are willing to work in combat zones.
Those who are willing to take risks (such as the Red Cross, CARE, and Medecins
Sans FrontieresjDoctors Without Borders) are routinely prevented from pro-
viding emergency food relief and medicine by combating groups. These
displaced people are also forced by one side or another to give military service,
and accused by one group or another of supporting an enemy.
Preventable diseases have continued to wipe out tens of thousands of
people in the South. The war has made it impossible to distribute medicine
against river blindness and vaccinations of measles and polio. Even under
normal circumstances, most people in the region are unreachable because of
poor infrastructure and heavy rainfall which makes roads unusable for much of
the year. About 80 percent of the world's guinea worm cases are found in
Southern Sudan, mainly because the war has made it difficult to tackle the water-
borne parasite which burrows into its host. Malaria kills more people now than
10 or 15 years ago. The anopheles mosquito, the variety that carries malaria, has
become rampant in many parts ofthe region. Incidents ofriver blindness are on
the rise. Tuberculosis has re-appeared one ofthe leading causes ofdeath among
the war-affected populations (see Jok's article in this volume). In 1995, former
United States President Jimmy Carter moderated efforts to allow reliefworkers
to treat cases of river blindness and guinea worm diseases in the region. That
effort was terminated with the expiration of the cease-fire.
Civilian death and casualties caused by land mines are on the rise in the
region as well. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross,
there are an estimated 500,000 to 2,000,000 land mines seeded in Southern
Sudan (Battersby, 1994: 6-7). Most roads and trails throughout the region are
mined. The mining of most roads has severely hampered the delivery of relief
supplies. Mines have also cut off access to water wells, arable land, and market
areas. Land mines are especially rampant around the principal towns ofJuba,
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Wau, Bar, Torit, and Kapoeta. The SPLM/A and other antigovernment
guerrilla forces heavily rely on land mines to ambush armored government
troops. The government also lays mines in strategic locations to inhibit the
movement of enemy guerrilla forces.
The devastation of the regional economy is enormous. Exchanges of
goods and services in the region have dwindled as a result ofa total collapse of
commercial networks. The war has disrupted traditional trading patterns,
closing trade routes to the north. The break-down of markets has especially
affected producers who depend on livestock sales for grain. The amount ofland
under cultivation has contracted due to large exodus ofthe labor force, as many
ofthe young and able-bodied have either been forced to flee to refugee camps
or recruited into the various guerrilla armies. The cattle population has
contracted as well, owing to looting by Arab militias. Livestock is important for
food security in the region, as milk and meat form part ofthe basic diet ofmost
ofthe population. The disruption ofveterinary services has also contributed to
the reduction of the cattle population. Additionally, intra-SPLM/A fighting
has resulted in cattle raiding, looting offood reserves, the total destruction of
communities and their economic and social infrastructure, and the collapse of
civil institutions. Consequently, a large proportion of the population of the
region have become dependent on outside food aid.
Both the government and the SPLM/A have little or no concern for
the rights of civilians, especially the government and the peoples militia it
sponsors. Both sides have used food as a political weapon, even though they
aggressively denied applying such a stratagem. The government has prevented
relieffood from reaching the starving civilians in the South, whom it accuses of
being sympathetic to the SPLM/A. It has prohibited relief agencies to
undertake humanitarian activities in SPLM/A-held territories and kicked out
those defYing the official insurrections. It has even denied reliefservices to those
people living in places under its control-civilians in towns such as Juba, Wau,
and Malakal, for instance-simply because they happen to be southerners and
use relieffood to feed its army. The government not only denies food to civilians
most in need, but also uses aerial bombardment against civilian targets as
principal tactics of war. In 1991, its Air Force bombed innocent southern
Sudanese refugees returning to Sudan from their sanctuaries in Ethiopia after
being expelled by the new Ethiopian government. The SPLM/A has also
prevented food reaching its own civilian population by mining roads and
assaulting relief convoys on the grounds that the government would use the
food to feed its army. The liberation front is also suspicious that the government
may use food as cover to transport weapons to replenish its army. Even when
the two sides agreed to a cease-fire to allow relief to reach the besieged civilian
population-as in the 1989 massive international relief effort, Operation
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Lifeline-it was not for humanitarian purposes but for military and political
considerations: to buy time to consolidate, regroup and rearm (Minear, 1991:
66).
During its nearly fourteen years of existence, the SPLM/A has acted
more like a military organization and less like a liberation movement. The
SPLM/A has not been able to bring any semblance of order to the so-called
liberated areas, let alone build political and social institutions that overshadow
tribal allegiance. Instead, the movement has often been reported to have been
engaged in the destruction ofvital economic and social infrastructure: blowing
up bridges and rail lines, mining roads, shooting down civilian air craft with no
military purpose (for instance, shooting down planes departing from Malakal
in 1986 and 1987), destroying telecommunication lines, disrupting agricul-
tural production, pilfering cattle and grain from civilians under its control,
attacking convoys seeking to supply food and medicine to besieged civilians (the
very people it claims it is fighting for), and forcing very young boys to join its
guerrilla force. For most boys army life begins as soon as they are old enough
to handle a rifle, usually at 12 or 13 years old. Forced conscription has driven
many young boys out oftheir villages, fleeing to the North or to refugee camps
in neighboring countries. Some 20,000 under-age boys are estimated to have
been coerced into joining the SPLM/A forces. The SPLM/A has also attacked
small tribal groups-the Mundari, Didinga, the Murle, and the Bari tribes, for
instance-for their neutrality or lack ofsupport. As a whole, the population in
the regions the SPLM/A claims it has liberated are far from enjoying their basic
human rights. Many hate the liberation movement as much as they hate the
government army. For many in the South both the SPLM/A and the govern-
ment are equally responsible for the destruction of their lives and their
environment. With respect to the human rights ofchildren, especially, both the
government and the SPLM/A have failed to uphold principles stipulated under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1930 International labor
Organization (ILO) Forced Labor Convention (No. 29) concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labor, the 1957 ILO Convention (No. 105) concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labor, the 1973 ILO Minimum Age Convention (No.
138), the African Charter, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to prevent and punish such abuses.
In many areas of the southern regions and bordering provinces, for
instance, southern Darfur and Kordofan, law and order is carried out by the local
militia, not by authorized state institutions. Arab militia, especially Baggara and
Rizeigat militias, which were deliberately created and armed by the central
government to impede the expansion ofthe southern rebellion, are using their
weapons to attack and pillage neighboring non-Arab communities. While
thousands have been forced to flee their land as a result, some ethnic groups
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have opted to stay and defend themselves by creating militia armies oftheir own,
armed with heavy weapons, including Kalashnikov AK 47s and bombs. Such
confrontations have degenerated into ethnic wars involving cattle raiding,
killing countless innocent people, and burning crops and destruction ofentire
villages. The impact ofthe war on the Dinka tribe is particularly profound. Tens
of thousands of Dinka people have lost their lives, many have been displaced,
and their cattle, which play vital social and economic roles, have been stolen by
Arab militias and non-Arab tribal enemies.
There is also another ugly impact of the war: a booming slave trade.
Slavery in Sudan dates back to the early 19th century when relentless waves of
Arab slave raiders went deep into southern Sudan and forcefully stole away
young and able-bodied Mricans. Even though slavery and slave trade were
abolished during the British colonial administration, northern Sudanese Arab
Muslims continued, albeit clandestinely, to raid southern Sudanese villages for
slaves to be sold in northern Sudan as laborers in farms and as domestic servants
or to be exported to other Arab countries. For years successive regimes in
Khartoum have denied the re-emergence of slavery and slave trade in the
country. However, recent independent studies and Human Rights Watch
reports indicate that northern Arabs routinely abduct southern young boys and
girls and sell them hundreds ofmiles away in the North. In 1987, in a detailed
study based on field work by two professors-Dr. Suleyman Ali Baldo and Dr.
Ushari Ahmed Mahmud of the University of Khartoum-discovered the
existence ofa well organized enslavement ofsouthern populations. Following
the publication of this study two independent Khartoum newspapers showed
as evidence several run-away slave children in the capital. Other international
and national organizations have also investigated and documented slave trading
in the country including the United Nations Labor organization (1993), the
U.S. State Department (1992), the Anti-Slavery Society (1987), the Mrican
Human Rights Watch, and Southern Sudanese organizations such as Pax
Sudani, the Southern Sudanese Community in America, and the Southern
Sudanese Resource Center (Alley, 1996: 1).
A report written in 1995 by the Comboni Fathers, Catholic mission-
aries in Sudan declared that slavery is not a thing of the past. It said: "Nothing
has changed in the way of life of these Arab groups for the past one hundred
years. Their only progress has consisted in the provision of large amounts of
modern weapons and up-to-date transportation. The time of long lines of
enchained slaves marching north is over. Now truckloads of children are seen
moving the same traditional direction." (Gregory, 1996: 37).
This abominable practice has gotten worse since the resumption ofthe
civil war in the South as the Sudanese troops and government-armed Arab
militias conduct their war ofattrition against southern populations perceived to
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be the support base of the SPLM/A. As one eye-witness-based report put it:
"The army and militias organize so-called 'Ghazzu', or raids, into southern
villages or the Nuba Mountains, burning the settlements and killing all the men
who do not succeed in escaping. The survivors, invariably children and women,
are then rounded up, divided into lots and split up as war booty between the
troops. The women and children are then transported to the north where they
are either sold, presented as gifts on special occasions, or otherwise shipped-off
to be sold at a premium in the rich Arab states of the Gulf or North Africa"
(Samboma, 1995: 1).
In the late 1996, the Christian Solidarity International (CSI), a Zurich-
based humanitarian organization, reported to have redeemed nearly 60 slaves-
mostly women and children-in the Province of Bahr el Ghazal. Testimonies
of freed slaves revealed consistent patterns of sexual abuse, beating, forced
Islamization, and denial ofadequate food. One of the slaves, a young mother,
told CSI the following:
The Arab militia came to my village early one morning in January 1995
while I was sleeping with my three children. We ran outside, but
immediately surrounded by Arabs on horses. We were forced to walk at
gun-point. My blind husband was left behind. The raiders forced me to
carry their booty on my head and my youngest child, Deng, on my back.
My other two childrenAkok and Kawac had to walk behind us. They both
died ofthirst during the long march to Dogg, near Saddama. There Deng
and I were separated. He went to the home ofour captor, Abdullah, while
I was sold to a man named Sarna. Sarna already had two wives and used
me as a concubine. He made me give birth to my little girl Achai. Sarna
was a cruel man who said his baby Achai was as worthless as a child of a
dog. Sarna beat me, while his wives made me work hard, grinding grain
and fetching water, while they were idle. They gave me no money, no
clothes and all I had to eat was the remnants of their food. Soon my
clothes perished, and I was left completely naked. Sarna also gave me the
Muslim name Kaddija and forced me to pray in the Islamic way. I tried
to resist, but they beat me with big bamboo sticks. One day, I ran away
and found a man from my tribe who took me to an Arab trader. This
trader bought me from Sarna and then sent me here to Manyiel with
another trader. I have been here for over one month, but cannot leave
because my family does not have the money and cows demanded by the
trader. He says he spent good money to buy me from Sarna, and must be
paid before I can go home (Africa News, November 1996: 1).
It is clear that slavery is a thriving practice in Sudan and the government
ofSudan actively encourages it. One Arab slave trader who sold a Dinka boy to
CSI spoke openly about the slave trade and the involvement ofthe government
army, the PDF, and other government-backed militias:
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The slave raids are undertaken by the PDF, with support from the regular
army.... In addition to the regular army, two NIF organizations, one
called "Birr" (Benevolence) and the other called "Jihad" (Islamic Striv-
ing or Holy War), supply the PDF with horses, weapons and communica-
tion. These militias on horseback then accompany the military train from
Khartoum. In the South, they burn villages and catch slaves. The
government of Sudan knows everything they do. Those who go on the
raids do so mainly for grain. They take slaves and sell them to cattle owners
for about one cow. I don't know how many slaves there are in the North,
but there are many. Most ofthe cattle owners have at least one slave. Most
of the slaves are treated brutally and are in a terrible condition. If a slave
resists his master he can be burnt alive. I condemn totally slavery and
related atrocities. It is not right for Muslims to take slaves. I am doing a
good thing by bringing children back. I do it to help them (CSI, 1996: 2).
Today, estimates put the number of Southern Sudanese taken into
slavery to be over 200,000 (Alley, 1996). Most of these are women and
children; the men are usually killed during the raids. Most ofthe cattle owning
Arabs in southern Kordofan and southern Darfur have at least one slave per
household, according to Sudanese Christian organizations. The central govern-
ment not only tolerates this atrocious practice but also encourages it as a weapon
ofwar against SPLM/A. The slave raids are usually accompanied by the looting
of cattle and the destruction ofvillages.
Many Christian groups and other humanitarian organizations working
in Sudan are increasingly involved in liberating enslaved children by purchasing
them back from slave raiders and owners. Bishop Macram Max Gassis ofSudan
testified before a United States congressional committee in 1996 that his
church had been instrumental in the freedom of 50 abducted children. The
Bishop added: "Their parents or relatives approached me after having identified
their children and needed money to be given to the abductors in order to
liberate them." (Gregory, 1996: 38). Unfortunately, this humanitarian help is
having unintended consequences. Slave raiders have increased their onslaught
to benefit from increased slave buy-back activities by humanitarian organiza-
tions.
The devastation to the lives and sources oflivelihood of the citizens of
southern Sudan is immeasurable. The war is being fought on their farmland,
pasture, villages, towns, and market places. The war has destroyed their basic
services such as schools, clinics, roads, mills, drinking water facilities and
commercial outlets, services that are in short supply during the peace times. In
the battlefield, it is their children that pay the ultimate heavy price. The
combatants on both sides are young southerners. As Berkeley recently noted:
In the Sudanese People's Armed Forces, the Government army, 90
percent ofthe rank and file are southerners while 96 percent ofthe officer
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corps come from northern or central Sudan. In the first five years ofthe
current war, when three-quarters of a million southerners died, only
3,000 northern government troops were killed. Ninety-five percent of
the combatants on both sides were southerners who fought for a variety
of reasons, from paychecks to outright coercion (Berkeley, 1996: 60).
Conclusion
It appears that Garang's military force is regammg some of the
territories from which it was expelled by the government army four years ago
and may achieve continued battlefield victories in the future. The question,
however, is: which way is southern Sudan heading? This question remains
unanswered. The leaders ofthe region appear to be in disagreement as to what
the goal of their struggle ought to be. At this point no one knows for sure
Garang's ultimate goal. Since the split, he has been consistently oscillating
between unity and independence. He knows that his unionist stance is
increasingly disfavored by many people in the South including the Dinka of
Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal provinces. Many in the South feel that the nation
state in which they had been coercively included by the British and northern
Sudanese elites has been intolerant from the very outset. They believe their
association with northern Sudan has brought them nothing but endless
miseries, and they ought to break away from it. Many are also doubtful of the
SPLM/A's goal of ultimately achieving a national victory over chauvinist,
corrupt, and undemocratic northern rulers. They feel that liberating the South
from northern political hegemony, cultural imperialism, and economic exploi-
tation ought to be the primary objective of the SPLM/A.
The independence of Eritrea seems to have given some hope and
comfort to pro-independence Southern Sudanese. They believe that the
colonially drawn borders sanctioned by the Organization ofMrican Unity no
longer prevent movements seeking self-determination from seceding, as the
case of Eritrea has demonstrated. Additionally, many southerners also cite the
absence of traditional, religious, linguistic, or cultural ties between them and
their northern counterparts in the North and that the North-South union from
the very beginning failed to recognize the wishes and interests of the South.
On the other hand, there are some southerners who believe that
autonomy within the federal system-as once sanctified by the 1972 Addis
Ababa Agreement-is the most realistic goal to pursue. However, many insist
that this goal should not be negotiated with the regime of the day, especially
with the current repressive Islamic military regime. The South must learn from
its past experience that the northern ruling elites have repeatedly betrayed the
South for too long. Any future political accord the South may enter with the
North ought to be reached through constitutional changes where major issues
such as religion and the state and regionalism, among others, are discussed and
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resolved by all political parties representative groups in the country. At any rate,
for the southern people any constitutional outcome that does not recognize
Sudan's religious and ethnic diversities, that does not separate religion and the
state, that does not recognize the historical, political and cultural necessity to
provide for an autonomous self-administering status for the South, and a
constitution that does not entitle regions with ownership and the right to use
their own resources in ways of their choice, may not be acceptable. Without a
secular constitution, many believe, it would be difficult to imagine Sudan
remaining united.
One of the real problems of southern Sudan is that there is universal
revulsion for northern political, economic and cultural hegemony but no solid
unity to fight against it. The region is unable to do away with tribal animosities
and distrust. Many southern elites continue to fall prey to divide and rule tactics
ofnorthern political elites. The division within the SPLM/A and the interethnic
violence and warfare have immensely hurt the liberation movement. As long as
the South remains divided, it can neither achieve military victory nor force the
government to opt for peaceful resolution. The leaders of the region ought to
know that the international community would also be less sympathetic to and
supportive of their struggle if they fail to put aside their differences and stand
united to advance their just struggle for self-determination.
There is, nonetheless, a greater danger for the South in lack of unity.
It will not only encumber the chances ofattaining independence or autonomy,
but will lead to the fragmentation of the South itself. After all, the South is far
from being homogeneous. It is diverse in its ethnic composition and religious
beliefs. The region is inhabited by the Nilotic peoples such as the Dinka, Nuer,
and Shilluk; the Nilo-Hamitic peoples such as the Bari, Latuko, Toposa, and
Murle; and the Sudanic peoples such as the Madi, Belanda, and Azande. The
people ofthe region speak over a hundred different languages. Many southern
tribes, especially those in the province of Equatoria, have long-held hostilities
and suspicions toward the Dinka. The Dinka, the majority tribal group
accounting for about 40 percent ofthe population ofthe South, had control of
the South when the region was accorded autonomy in the 1970s and many
smaller tribes now fear a return to Dinka domination ofthe South as one region.
There also exists profound aversion toward the SPLM/A for atrocities it has
committed on many occasions against civilians reluctant to support the
movement. Some minority tribal groups say they favor neither a united Sudan
nor a united South, and are determined not to accept any political arrangement
short of a complete political autonomy for their own individual homeland.
There is also a growing pessimism among the population and southern
political leaders about the outcome ofthe war. Some rebel leaders even concede
that neither side can win the war. The war has already caused great loss oflives
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and immense destruction ofthe socio-economic fabric ofthe South. Attempts
for a negotiated peace settlement have failed and cease-fire negotiations are
going nowhere. The best hope of these leaders is that increasing national and
international pressure will lead the regime in Khartoum to share power or even
be willing to grant autonomy to the South. They consider the latest United
States' support for Sudan's unfriendly neighbors and the diplomatic and
economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations as good steps towards this
end. These leaders are also amenable to a confederation arrangement between
the North and the South. In this scenario, the two parts would have a separate
sovereign constitution. The South would have a secular constitution, while the
North may opt to govern itself on Islamic principles. A joint secular Central
Authority would be created to handle matters of common interest. The
Khartoum regime has thus far shown little interest in this possible solution.
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